Education in Fragile States: Capturing Lessons and Identifying Good Practice

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1. Introduction

1.1 Structure of the Paper

The DAC characterises fragile states as countries with poor governance as identified by a *lack of political commitment* and/or *weak capacity* to develop and implement *pro-poor policies*; fragile states also often experience *violent conflict*. The DAC framework categorises fragile states as follows:[1]

- Deterioration (Conflict/risk of conflict; Declining capacity and/or will)
- Arrested development (Lack of will; Moderate or high capacity)
- Post-conflict transition (Risk of conflict; Low capacity; High or low will)
- Early recovery (May be post-conflict or not; High will but low capacity).

This paper examines how development assistance in these four environments can enhance access to quality basic education for the poor and vulnerable, at the same time improving governance and thereby mitigating the risks of fragility, and increasing the effectiveness of future aid.[2] Section two introduces the concept of *turnaround* – how a state's fragility may be sufficiently reduced to allow sustainable pro-poor growth – as well as the 'rights' and 'risks' considerations that impact donor decision making and effectiveness. Section three examines will and capacity in the education sector; section four explores political economy implications for sequencing and planning; and section five considers how education can support state-building from the bottom up. Section six focuses on aid effectiveness in fragile states, where donor coordination instruments may be needed to sustain transitions to post-emergency support in environments still likely to be fragile. The paper concludes with recommendations in section seven.[3]

1.2 The Study Context

It has been estimated that as many as a third to one-half of children out of school live in fragile states, and that gender inequalities in these states are greater than elsewhere.[4] Even in countries where overall enrolment appears reasonably high, reaching excluded groups such as children with disabilities, orphan/separated children, demobilised children, and un-schooled youth may be particularly important in addressing a country's causes of fragility. Moreover, education is seen to play an important role in influencing fragility, positively or negatively, and schools may be targeted in efforts to undermine government legitimacy.[5] Agencies working on education recognise that the 'relief-development dichotomy is an artificial one',[6] and that as 'a long-term endeavour, [education] needs to be planned in that [long-term] way.'[7] This highlights the importance of planning beyond the immediate in supporting education interventions, but does not mean a uniform response is appropriate.

As several authors note, education and (post-) conflict is an emerging field of study, even though it is an area that NGOs have been actively working in for a considerable length of time.[8] The recent attention is in part due to the Inter-agency Network on Education in Emergencies (INEE) pushing for education as the fourth pillar of humanitarian relief. The INEE emerged following commitments made at the 2000 World Conference on Education for All and in recognition of the neglect of education within international agency humanitarian responses. The INEE has been important in establishing minimum standards for education in such settings. Although the INEE

focuses on emergency situations, that focus has inevitably raised the importance of continuity and early planning for transition to a post-emergency environment.

Several international agencies have also developed policy papers in the area, which are in part responsive to different agenda as illustrated in Box 1.[9] The education focus of each agenda is also listed. While overlap exists, the plurality of objectives underscores the importance of aid prioritisation and coordination in fragile states.

Box 1: Agenda for support to education in Fragile States	
Agenda	**Education focus**
Security Agenda	• negative and positive political use • national identity formation • disaffected youth • religious schooling • social cohesion
Humanitarian Agenda	• community-based engagement • schools as safe spaces
Education For All Agenda	• rights-based approach • addressing exclusion • active citizenship, tolerance, and peace-building
Millennium Development Goals Agenda	• national growth and poverty reduction; focus on primary schooling

Even though often not the focus of post-conflict analytic frameworks,[10] education has an increasingly important role in the broader security agenda because of education's potential contribution to peace building. Moreover, education services may have a comparative advantage among sectors in demonstrating quick impact and spending, and thereby serve as a point of entry for broader donor engagement in improving service delivery and governance. Indeed, education investment that fails to address governance issues may do harm.

The security agenda for fragile states focuses on education's role in renewing the social contract between a government and its citizens. By contrast, the humanitarian agenda demands fast action on education service delivery. As post-emergency conditions improve, transitions to the EFA and MDG agenda may become more feasible. However, both these sector-specific agenda depend upon peace and state capacity. The agenda are interlocking in this sense but there are also trade-offs between these priorities. Beyond direct service delivery, *effective* aid modalities need also to address higher order issues of political economy that inhibit state capacity and will, and undermine development effectiveness as discussed in the following section.

2. Turnaround and Education - Assessing Rights and Risks

2.1 Turnaround

The conventional aid effectiveness literature[11] does not tell us how to work towards development goals in fragile states' contexts.[12] The fragile states literature *has* developed an approach – turnaround – which can improve our assessment of what to

do when. Beyond their rights-based imperatives, education services can contribute to other development needs. In the context of fragile states, education has a further potential contribution in reducing the causes of fragility. Sufficient reduction in fragility results in what the fragile states literature refers to as 'turnaround'.

Turnaround has being defined in different ways. An outcomes measure developed recently has three components: a durable cessation of violent conflict; sustained economic growth; and, sustained improvements in human development indicators.[13] Turnaround then is a proxy for an improving policy context which enhances pro-poor growth potential. In addition to their direct poverty-reduction or service delivery objectives, aid programmes and projects can contribute to turnaround through:

(i) bringing about sustainable change in governance;
(ii) catalysing change outside the area/sector/theme of the original intervention;
(iii) stemming negative spillover effects from one region or country into the other regions or a neighbouring country

The governance improvements relate to state will and capacity. These can be enhanced by encouraging or enabling changes in other sectors, through example or through joint provision. The benefits of stemming negative spillover, which is a neglected but substantial cost of fragility,[14] are an important justification for aid interventions. Programmes and projects can contribute towards these objectives through careful attention to design considerations and through the quality of their implementation processes.[15]

Using this turnaround framework, one recent paper[16] has provided a synthesis of a set of fragile states[17] studies giving examples of apparent aid effectiveness from different sectors. A key overall finding from the research was the importance of community-level initiatives in fragile states. Community-driven and community-based development[18] has been an important anchor for education interventions in fragile states. This might suggest a key role for education services in contributing to turnaround and section five below, on building from the bottom up, reviews and assesses such interventions. However, as the synthesis paper and examples in section five of this paper make clear, the 'community' is not without divisions or contest; understanding local context and responding to that knowledge in programme design and implementation is vital. These contexts reflect different conditions of fragility and determine the likelihood of achieving turnaround.

In fact, the concept of turnaround relates very closely to the DAC typology of fragile states - identified by different combinations of capacity and will - because it presumes a degree of will, and ultimately capacity, on the part of national governments. There is a clear divide between countries which are assessed as early recovery and those that are arrested or deteriorating. For these latter countries, there is little evidence of the political will required to adopt the better policies which are necessary for effective public investment, especially that using donor resources. The fourth category of fragile states, post-conflict transition, may often be a country where political will exists, particularly where international support to peace processes has been provided effectively.

2.2 Risks and Rights - where can donors work best?

Turnaround creates conditions which reduce the risks of donor investment through the state. This applies to education where the implicit presumption is that the management, and in most cases, delivery of basic education services is undertaken by the state. But how can education service delivery contribute to turnaround? As one of the most visible state services and one that affects all people, education has an important symbolic value in (re-)establishing the legitimacy of the state.[19] It is also a basic human right and one that therefore demands priority. But, where conditions of fragility imperil the development outcomes of educational investment, these reasons may not persuade donors that their investment is worthwhile. The likelihood that donor support will help create turnaround conditions is very low where will is weak or non-existent.[20] Donors can play a key role in reducing the likelihood of failure, and there are found to be particularly high returns to technical assistance, which can strengthen both capacity and will.[21] However, aid is risky and there is no guarantee that such reductions in fragility will occur; they are more likely not to. The prior existence of some initial will on the part of the national government is a critical pre-condition for enhancing the prospects of turnaround.

In effect, international agencies often have a choice to make between supporting education as a right, or, deciding that the risk is too high that their support to education might be unsuccessful and wasted or even damaging. There are also risks of *not* intervening in education. If the failure to deliver improved education services is a potential source of exacerbation to security conditions then failure to act may make fragility worse. Moreover, there may be opportunities through thoughtful and appropriate design and implementation to strengthen financing arrangements to reduce the risk of delivering services; e.g. through improved accountability of locally-based service delivery using community mechanisms. The availability of such opportunities, or the capacity to create them, will be important in assessing the likelihood of delivering educational outcomes and contributing to turnaround. These opportunities depend upon levels of will and capacity and the next section explores these concepts in the context of education. We return to the rights and risks trade-off in section six.

3. Willingness and capacity in the education sector: Identifying political economy challenges and approaches

3.1 Will and capacity as coordinates of fragility

Education is viewed in most contexts as a state responsibility, with legislation aimed at supporting universal access to basic schooling. Most often, this is understood to mean that the state should provide education directly, so as far as capacity allows. Such provision can promote state legitimacy - where legitimacy is understood as the ability of the government to work in the interest of the public and demonstrate fairness to all groups in providing security and services. Education is particularly key given it is the largest, most widespread and visible institution in the country, evident even in remote regions. Its size, as well as its cultural, social and economic dimensions, make it one of the most difficult institutions to govern and manage[22] and are a challenge to state will and capacity. State will and capacity go hand in hand. Without the capacity to make and implement policy, well-intended political commitments may be unrealised.

Will and capacity are influenced by many factors and the fragile states typology is useful in identifying key strategic deficits in different fragile states' conditions. For example in deteriorating conditions it might not be feasible or appropriate to work with the state, while in early recovery donors can start working alongside the state often through support to non-state actors, with a gradual transition to the state playing a greater role in service delivery. Applying the fragile states' typology is not, however, necessarily straightforward, as many responses by stakeholders working within the education sector in different contexts have noted. Use of the typology is challenging, because transition between phases is not linear, it depends, for example, on duration, intensity and cause of conflict, not just the phase. Specific conditions of will and capacity also need to be unpacked. Moreover, as examples in section five highlight, they need to be extended beyond a focus on the state – as local willingness and capacity to sustain education can be evident even in conditions of arrested development or deterioration.

3.2 Unpacking Will

Broadly conceived, political will is conventionally understood as the sustained commitment of politicians and administrators to invest political resources to achieve specific objectives. It is the willingness of these actors to undertake pro-poor reform and implement policy, even where there is opposition. Will combines two attributes: 'legitimacy' and 'aspirations' - evidenced through commitment to a pro-poor development agenda. As elaborated in section five, in reality there can be multiple levels of will involving a broader range of actors beyond politicians and administrators. Specifically, they can include communities (parents, teachers, principals etc.) that can muster capacity to keep education going, or to invest in education even when there is no state will, when there is no state, or when the state is contested. Political will can be further unpacked into three inter-related concepts:

3.2.1 Commitment

Commitment can be embodied in individuals or groups of individuals sharing a common interest including political parties or states. Commitment to achieving education goals can be legal or political. For example, psychological abuse, corporal punishment, sexual harassment and rape pose real barriers to female teachers and students entering and staying in school in fragile states.[23] Legislation against the abuse of girls is a measure of legal commitment, but is often not sufficient where there is not the capacity to enforce it.

Goals and targets, such as those associated with EFA and the MDGs can be part of political commitment aimed at enhancing accountability of politicians, managers and educators by providing monitorable targets. Being part of these international commitments can afford legitimacy to countries from the international community providing them with opportunities to benefit from increased aid (for example through the Education for All Fast Track Initiative - FTI) which, in turn, can enhance capacity to fulfil their commitments. Not surprisingly, many fragile states lack education plans and poverty reduction strategies which are often used as signals of political commitment, including for joining the FTI.

The experience of post-genocide Rwanda and post-revolutionary Mozambique suggests that where a process of transformation is underway in the context of early

recovery, policy makers have an opportunity to show commitment to more radical education reforms, including ones related to gender.[24]

3.2.2 Leadership

Leadership is evident at the community, local and national levels. At the grassroots level support for education might be initiated by teachers, civil society, NGOs, traditional and religious leaders etc, while in other cases change is driven by national leaders, or international champions. Ideally, these will work together to support the process of reform, but in the context of fragile states such relationships are likely to be fragmented and require (re-)building as countries move towards early recovery. Harnessing the support of traditional and religious leaders can be crucial, as they can be a key role in supporting (or hindering) demand for schooling, as well as influencing what is taught in schools for example with respect to HIV/AIDS prevention. In Uganda, part of the success in relation to falling HIV prevalence rates is attributed to President Museveni gaining the support of leaders of the Catholic and Protestant community, encouraging his officials to work with them to avoid antagonising them.[25]

As evidence from country case studies in the four different conditions of fragility illustrates, the importance of transition from international to national leadership, with emphasis on promoting domestic ownership of education sector development, is found to be crucial for promoting legitimacy, and resonates with principles associated with turnaround. Political leadership cannot, however, be relied upon given the frequent turnover of appointments, and it is important to identify and support leadership that is most appropriate in a given setting.[26]

3.2.3 Responsiveness

Responsiveness entails relationships of accountability between citizens (particularly parents of school-aged children), their government and educational providers. In many cases, responsiveness will only arise if demand is both loud and articulate enough to require response from decision makers and service providers. This 'long-route' accountability might not be feasible in some fragile states where governments do not exist or lack legitimacy. In such cases, a 'short-route' to accountability directly between parents/communities and education non-state providers is likely to be more effective, while raising challenges for transferring responsibilities in the longer term to states as they aim to gain legitimacy.[27] In post-conflict settings, visible education reforms, such as abolition of fees, have played an important role in newly democratic states seeking to gain legitimacy. For example, in Burundi primary school fees were abolished in 2005 following one-party elections. This resulted in international agencies, such as DFID, providing financial supporting given it is in keeping with international agenda associated with MDGs. Less visible reforms, such as improvements to quality of education (a key concern after rapid expansion following abolition of fees, as witnessed in Burundi and elsewhere), or ones that might challenge political authority and patronage systems such as in relation to support for girls' education, might gain less attention in elections.[28]

3.3 Unpacking Capacity

Capacity can also be broken down into three, inter-related, aspects.

3.3.1 Individual capacity

Individual capacity is embodied in the quality, skills and commitment of (for instance) individual administrators and teachers. Teachers need the skills and commitment to teach girls and boys effectively. In fragile states, teachers can face additional challenges, for example in addressing ethnic or religious differences in the classroom which might be the cause of dissatisfaction, and in needing to provide psychological support to those traumatised by conflict. Key administrators are needed with skills to carry out robust analysis of the education sector, to identify interventions that build on this analysis, to support the implementation of interventions, and to monitor progress. In arrested development and deteriorating conditions such capacity is often destroyed, and requires rebuilding in post-conflict/early recovery situations.

3.3.2 Organisational capacity

Organisational capacity relates to the ability of educational organisations (schools and ministries of education, for example) to deliver on their mandates. This capacity may be constrained by inadequate human resources and financial systems, poor management, inadequate systems and processes for decision making, and inadequate information gathering and analytical capacity, all of which are likely to be particularly weak in fragile states.

3.3.3 Institutional context

The institutional context embodies the 'rules of the game' that shape the way individuals and organisations act and behave. Informal and formal institutions and the incentives they create can influence fragility, and possibilities to deliver education in such contexts. In the formal sphere, key institutional areas for ministries of education and schools include the state, market and community.[29]

Resources dedicated to education (measured both as a percentage of GDP, and of total government expenditure) would provide an indication of state capacity and will. This can also have implications for fragility, where insufficient allocation of resources results in inability to pay teachers which can heighten dissatisfaction. From international data, very limited information is available on allocation share of education for fragile states though not surprisingly available data shows that fragile states typically have low education expenditures per pupil.[30] Where education is under-funded by government, as section five indicates, education provision often relies on community/household financing.

4. Education service delivery adaptation

4.1 Prioritising and sequencing change

The focus of education provision might vary depending on the extent of local and national willingness and capacity, and the different roles education needs to play in different contexts, including:

- Education as prevention which might be an appropriate focus where a country is in danger of deteriorating, or is in arrested development.
- Education as protection which might be necessary during times of conflict/deterioration.
- Education for peace-building, and to provide psychological support which is particularly important in early recovery/post-conflict phases – although also

needs attention during conflict. This is crucial to ensure education can help mitigate the risk of returning into conflict.

Each of these approaches might have implications for the type of education offered, and indicate the need to address not just what is taught, but how it is taught and by whom. Based on an analysis of country case studies in each of the four phases of fragility, USAID-sponsored studies draw conclusions on setting of priorities (Box 2). Their analysis recognises that there is no blue-print for priorities, and that consensus around setting them needs to be negotiated within a particular context.

Box 2: Priorities for education in fragile states

- Teacher training: (1) an immediate roll-out of basic teacher training workshops and (2) first steps to build a teacher training system;
- Learning materials (1) immediate delivery of whatever useful materials are available for teachers and students, and (2) first steps to build a relevant curriculum and quality textbook procurement and distribution system;
- Community support: (1) immediate measures to reconnect families and communities with their schools and (2) first steps to institutionalize school-community relationships;
- Learning spaces: (1) immediate help to communities in finding safe and healthy places to teach, even if temporary and (2) first steps to map schools and set construction standards and procedures.

The best strategies will combine activities to meet these four priority objectives simultaneously. Once progress toward these objectives is certain and if additional resources are available, a second set of priorities would include the following:

- Management training: (1) Hands-on guidance in how to manage people and resources and (2) continuing management training on-the-job as well as in short, just-in-time courses for ministry staff and NGOs;
- Planning and budgeting: (1) immediate technical support to the ministry in assessing the availability of funds and other resources and planning their most advantageous use and (2) building a planning and budgeting process and system that is integrated with extra-ministerial agencies;
- Monitoring and evaluation: (1) immediate technical support to help teachers and schools continuously assess students' performance and (2) first steps toward a comprehensive system of exams for students and a system that monitors the performance of schools.

Finally, there are longer-term challenges that must eventually be met if the ministry of education is to function effectively in a sustained way. These include:

- Personnel procedures, salary adjustments and payroll processes;
- Recruitment, deployment, management system;
- A pre-service training system;
- Relationships with decentralized, local governance institutions and teachers unions;
- A school construction program;
- An education management information system to support the planning system.

Extracted from: Creative Associates, 2006.

As these priorities indicate, while identification of appropriate learning spaces is needed, this does not necessarily require investment in expensive infrastructure (which in any case takes time to develop). In addition, selective use of existing textbooks (removing any that might be inflammatory) is feasible at little or no expense in the short-term. As such, schooling does not need large investments in school buildings or textbooks to be effective, although these may be considered desirable as a visible commitment to education, and are often prioritised by international agencies. Schooling cannot occur, however, without teachers, or without a curriculum to teach – both of which have the potential to be important drivers of change and so support turnaround. Without due attention, they can also fuel fragility.

4.1.1 Developing curriculum as a driver of change

Attention to curriculum development can be crucial both to ensure that conditions do not deteriorate, and also to ensure children receive an education that supports values associated with tolerance, social cohesion etc. which will have implications for future generations. Moreover, the process of designing curriculum reform is an important aspect of state-building, and needs to be seen as a state responsibility in post-conflict settings involving different stakeholders (including teachers), rather than as an NGO (or donor agency) undertaking for quick results. It is important to implement curriculum reform gradually to ensure national consensus is reached. In the short-term, it might be desirable to suspend teaching of sensitive subjects, for example history, until such consensus is achieved, and also to remove textbooks that might be inflammatory in the language they use, pictures they display etc.[31]

There are many examples of curriculum being used with both negative and positive effects. In Rwanda, the school curriculum was found to be a vehicle through which ethnic and racial hatred was fuelled prior to the genocide. The reformulation of the curriculum has been a key element in the early recovery phase, which has been possible due to strong national leadership committed to addressing the causes of conflict within the education system. History has not yet been taught since the genocide in 1994, although there is a strong desire to understand the causes of the genocide as a way of ensuring conditions which led to it do not re-emerge.[32] In Palestine, the process of designing the new curriculum is reported to have helped build faith in the education system, which again has been a target during the conflict in the region. In Southern Sudan, education was a location to express resistance, particularly as attempts were made to impose Arabic as the language of instruction and Islamicise the curriculum, which was even evident in the mathematics curriculum along with history and geography.[33] Moreover, attempts to introduce harmony by 'eliminating' difference in schools in Sudan were found to reinforce difference, a result suggested to be similar—albeit unintentional—to multiculturalism in Western schools.[34] Most often, use of local languages as medium of instruction has been found to be beneficial both pedagogically as well as to promote social cohesion, but in some contexts, adoption of local languages may heighten tension where this excludes minority groups. As such, the choice of languages needs careful consideration depending on a particular setting.

In the context of the post-9/11 security agenda, particular attention is being paid to teaching in madrassas (Islamic schools), which are considered to be spaces for breeding of religious fundamentalist attitudes. One approach has been to attempt to align madrassas with government systems. In the Philippines, for example, steps

have been taken to integrate their religious curriculum with the secular knowledge and skills of the government curriculum.[35] Motivations for governments (and donors) to engage with such religious schools might have less to do with concern for their educational effectiveness and more to do with political concerns. In the 1980s, for example, the Pakistani government started to give grants to madrassas but at the same time it encouraged Pakistani madrassas to support and train the Afghani fighters for the Soviet-Afghan war. Madrassas which took in large number of the Afghan students received increased government grants.[36] Since 2001, the Pakistani government is again providing financial incentives to madrassas under a US-funded programme but this time for the opposite reasons: to align them with the curriculum of schools in the government system and disarm them of militancy that the state had encouraged in the 1980s, in the context of seeing them as a breeding ground for Muslim fundamentalists and terrorists.[37]

One area of unresolved debate is whether/when attention should be given to teaching specific subjects associated with peace education, citizenship education, human rights education etc. These are often developed in post-conflict settings (including with support of international NGOs and donor agencies) to support peace-building.[38] There have been few evaluations of the specific programmes,[39] partly because it takes time before the effects of such curricular are known – the formation of attitudes and values become evident as children move into adulthood. Moreover, a challenge for these subjects, however well designed, is the need for teachers with skills (and desire) to teach them.

4.1.2 Supporting teachers as drivers of change

On the one hand, teachers can be targets during conflict where they are seen as propagators of state ideology, might find it difficult to teach where this involves challenging the values of their own community, or might themselves be involved in perpetuating conflict.[40] On the other hand, teachers are 'the most critical resource in education reconstruction.'[41] Teachers may be involved in supporting education on a voluntary basis through community initiatives that can be built on in the future where state will and/or capacity to deliver is weak. In addition, teachers may be the most highly trained members of a community, where teacher training is the only form of post-basic education that survives as conditions deteriorate.[42] Teachers trained in refugee camps are an example where they can become an important resource in post-conflict situations (Box 3).

Box 3: The role of teachers in building capacity in Liberia

An entire generation was educated in refugee camps in Guinea before being repatriated to Liberia. As often the case, education in the refugee camps (supported by UNHCR and International Rescue Committee - IRC) was of better quality than the population would get access to in Liberia. This included teacher training, with attention to gender in the programmes. Trained teachers were an important cadre of people in supporting the transition post-conflict, as they helped to kick-start the education system in conflict-affected areas, or developed civil society space through forming local NGOs. As such, leveraging capacity built in refugee contexts, and developing this from the outset with an eye to the future, can be important to support post-conflict development. Given the important role teachers play, the need for attention to teacher training is recognised even during emergency situations. In practice, teacher training often collapses in deteriorating/arrested development phases, but where it can be supported this can have important implications for post-conflict recovery. A

key challenge in the transition towards post-conflict is that teacher qualifications from one country may not be recognised when refugees are repatriated. In recognition of this, UNHCR and IRC have been supporting initiatives by helping to negotiate the recognition of teacher qualifications with the Liberian Ministry of Education.

Source: IRC, 2005. See also Sinclair, 2002

Given skills developed through teaching, teachers may be in a position to support development within the education sector, or in the country more generally, by taking jobs the public sector as state capacity and will are strengthened. However, this raises a danger that the experienced teaching force may become drained as other jobs are available. In some cases, there may be a shortage of teachers in early recovery phases (particularly where education systems expand dramatically in the post-conflict phase). In other cases, there may be a surplus of teachers, and so a need for rationalisation – even so, the existing teaching force often requires upgrading of skills. Such in-service training needs to be balanced with attention to pre-service training, to ensure a new cadre of teachers continue to be made available.

Ability to pay teacher salaries is a crucial signal of state legitimacy, helps to restore confidence in governing authorities, and can avoid dissatisfaction amongst an influential group of the population. This requires not only funds to be available to pay adequate salaries, but also capacity to manage the payroll, and mechanisms to pay teachers where no banking system exists. It can mean that budgetary support for managing and paying teacher salaries is appropriate despite the risks associated with weak financial management to support a country's move towards early recovery.[43] In Sudan, initially there was no coordinated or consistent strategy on paying teachers following the signing of the peace treaty, resulting in unpredictable and inequitable pay and loss of teachers to other jobs.[44] The Multi-donor Trust Fund has sought to provide a way to bridge the gap while capacity is being built.

An additional challenge during the transition towards a system-wide approach is that where community-recruited teachers are considered under-qualified in terms of government criteria, the government may be reluctant to include them on the payroll so they continue to depend on volatile voluntary contributions, which communities may be less enthusiastic to support now they consider education a state responsibility. Even if teachers are able to get a job in a government school, they are likely to enter at the bottom of the scale.

Moreover, evidence from Southern Sudan indicates that female teachers can play a particularly key role, both in providing a secure environment for girls who might be in danger of abuse, and supporting gender relations more generally, which will have important development implications.[45] It might also be desirable to prioritise training of female teachers in refugee camps, as they are found to be more likely to use their skills as teachers after repatriation, while males are more mobile and able to seek better paid work in other areas.[46] However, female teachers themselves need protection during conflict.

4.2 Planning beyond the basic

While the MDG and EFA goals place emphasis on basic education, attention to post-basic education is likely to be crucial in fragile states – both to mitigate risks of fragility through attention to disaffected youth, and to promote turnaround through support to higher levels of education for capacity development. Based on cross-country analysis, secondary education has been found to be associated with increased prospects of state willingness to adopt policy reforms.[47] This is intuitively plausible; greater numbers of educated people are likely to make the servants of the state (civil servants, teachers) more informed and to encourage citizens to articulate demand for services from their government. This does not mean that support for secondary education will necessarily make sense. An appropriate institutional basis must exist and the teaching and learning agenda must not further the causes of fragility.

Moreover, the development of different levels of education is partly influenced by what is feasible under difficult circumstances. Primary education declines but often continues to be supported in some form by local community initiatives even in conditions of arrested development and deterioration. There is found to be resilience of education at this level. However, secondary and higher education, requiring more skilled teaching staff and complex, expensive, infrastructure and learning materials, often collapses under such conditions – and takes more time to rebuild. Given post-basic institutions often play a role in political tensions, this can either mean that states want to play a more controlling role, or are unwilling to pay attention to supporting these levels, depending on the circumstances.

As a country moves towards early recovery, lack of secondary school opportunities has been found to be a source of tension between returning refugees have been used to a better quality education supported at higher levels and than those who stayed behind and are limited to a basic education.[48] A further danger can arise where secondary schooling is unequally distributed across the country, for example, primarily provided in urban areas. This can either resulting in migration to gain access, putting a strain on other infrastructure (including, for example, sewerage systems) in these areas, or be a cause of dissatisfaction in areas which are neglected.

There are very few examples of international agencies supporting higher education in fragile state environments. Experience of recent US embassy support to a new American University of Afghanistan indicates that this has not been straightforward, in part because decisions were driven by political imperatives rather than informed by education priorities. An important consideration was the need to respond to the emerging domestic agenda which was sensitive about the heavy dependence on expatriate personnel for basic state bureaucratic functions. Support to the new university also gave opportunity to influence the redevelopment of this capacity at the same time as showing intent of long term commitment. Inevitably though, such support was contentious. Some working in the education sector in Afghanistan did not consider it to be the most appropriate use of funds given the state of the system at the time – including under-funding of primary schooling, that existing universities in the country were in need of support, and that youth and adults who had not been able to access the formal system required attention.[49]

Youth education is a key area requiring attention in early recovery/post-conflict phases, particularly to provide opportunities to those denied access to schooling opportunities previously, and to give support to those affected by conflict.[50] Youths are seen as an important threat to stability, as well as having potential for contribution to reconstruction and development.[51] As such, high youth unemployment is identified as one of nine risk factors for conflict risk indicators in World Bank Conflict Analysis Framework.[52] Programmes to support youth education include accelerated learning for former child soldiers. In Liberia, since 1999, an accelerated learning programme supported by UNICEF condenses primary schooling from six years into three years by compressing the curriculum with a focus on skills development. The programme is designed in a way to allow them to re-join secondary school. Alternatively, a programme was developed combining vocational training in masonry and agriculture, together with literacy and numeracy and life skills training. This both allows youth to reintegrate into economic activities, and also ensures skills are developed in key areas required to support the re-building of the country.[53]

Youth education programmes need to be developed in the light of available livelihood opportunities, otherwise there is a danger that they heighten expectations of post-education opportunities that cannot be fulfilled, and so create antagonism. One approach to this is to design programmes in consultation with the youth who are the intended beneficiaries, based on what they consider to be their needs within a particular context. In addition, the programmes require more careful monitoring and evaluation than usually apparent, not just in terms of learning outcomes, but also the livelihood opportunities they give rise to.

In practice most attention by international agencies has focused on basic education in line with international priorities associated with MDGs – and this is evident from the innovative experiences that it has been possible to draw on in the following Section, which mainly focus on basic education.

5. Designing education service delivery for fragile states – Building from the bottom up

As noted, there are two potential routes of accountability (Appendix 2). In fragile states there is often reliance on short route accountability where a legitimate state does not exist, and/or does not have the capacity to provide. The short-route may be supported by spontaneous community initiatives or non-state providers such as (international) NGOs. While such provision meets the immediate service delivery needs of some users, coverage is likely to be fragmented and unsustainable.

This section considers several successful approaches for blending short- and long-route accountability by supporting both immediate education service delivery and longer-term state-building to mitigate risks of increased fragility, and promote turnaround. It is possible, for example, to work with weak governments when at least some will to support policy reform can be identified at the national or local level.[54] In states lacking both the capacity and will to implement pro-poor policies, opportunities exist for shadow alignment in which external resources fund NGOs to develop systems that can be ultimately be inherited by the state. Such shadow alignment

does not necessarily result in the domestic ownership of the agenda, however, and so attention needs to be paid to this from the outset.

The examples in this section indicate that, for education, there is nearly always will to support education at some level (whether locally, and/or at the level of the state) – and the key issue is to identify where such will exists and support it. Where this occurs, capacity can be developed which can ultimately support a system-wide approach, if appropriately planned with attention to the future. Each of the examples draw on experiences dependent on individual contexts, and any attempt at replication would require analysis of local political, economic, social and security factors when selecting and designing education interventions. This section concludes with summary remarks for the four fragile states environments as well as an examination of the challenges in the blended approach.

5.1 Planning for longer-term state-building within the short-route

Where a state lacks legitimacy, donor focus is often on supporting service providers directly, usually through INGOs. INGO provision may be cast as pilots in order to highlight their role as testing of innovative practices in order not to undermine state building. However, this can also mean that they can lack a 'clear strategy to link them to permanent pro-poor change'.[55] INGOs must make a difficult transition from an emergency approach to a longer term developmental agenda in which they need to work more closely with local government structures.

An example of an attempt to link service delivery with sustainable development within the sector is evident in SC-UK's work in Somalia and Somaliland, where different approaches are used depending on the feasibility of working with and through the state. SC-UK develops its programmes in consultation with the Ministry of Education, regional and local authorities, and at community and school levels when possible, and with local community and clan 'authorities' where the state is absent (Box 4).

Box 4: Designing education service delivery programmes to support capacity development in Somalia and Somaliland

The Hiran region of Somalia has lacked a central government since the early 1990's. This created a vacuum in the organisation and co-ordination of education. In response, a regional education body (HREC) was formed. Its function was to oversee education activities in the Hiran region. However, the lack of local capacity, funds and extended internal conflict have made the HREC coordination largely ineffective. SC-UK's Basic Education Programme provides an opportunity for strengthening the HREC's capacity, through its inclusion of the Education Network of Hiran. In the case of the Togdheer region of Somaliland, the Basic Education Programme is designed to be implemented in close consultation with the Ministry of Education, the local authorities in Burao, the regional capital of Togdheer, and, at school community level, with head-teachers, teachers, children and parents.

The capacity developed by the Basic Education Programme is intended to constitute a vital resource for any national government that may be formed in Somalia in the future, since any incoming government will inevitably lack management and administrative capacity in several sectors.

Extracted from: SC-UK (nd).

Where planning for longer-term state-building occurs from an early phase and is included in the contractual arrangements between donors and INGOs, it can help ensure a smooth transition towards supporting state accountability and legitimacy as possibilities arise. The development of these relationships requires monitoring, to assess both whether longer-term state building has been supported, as intended (within the objective in this case of 'enhanced education planning'), as well as to assess its direct impact on schooling. The latter is more frequently evaluated in practice, for example in terms of increased enrolment and improved performance, since they are easier to measure (see also Section 6.4 with respect to the INEE fifth category for minimum standards for education in emergencies).

This approach envisages that the Basic Education Programme, largely community-led, will form the basis for state-managed programmes when a state exists. SC-UK brings a sound knowledge of the local challenges and is keenly aware of the need to build systems. But such expertise is not readily reproducible, and requires vision on behalf of the state if it is to be effective. This has been possible in Toghdeer Region of Somaliland, where a draft government education plan is available, but not in Hiraan. In addition, there are concerns that given the uncoordinated, ad-hoc project basis on which INGOs more generally work in the country, after over a decade of intervention their innovative work has not produced sustainable systems.

5.2 Supporting education service delivery through working with *de jure* and *de facto* government structures

In some cases of arrested development, working directly through the state is not an option due to local opposition to or lack of recognition of the government, and schooling itself being a source of conflict. In such situations, INGOs often aim to build relationships with rebel movements in order to ensure education services can be delivered without disruption. During the conflict in southern Sudan, INGOs and UNICEF worked with the then rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), which allowed support to peace-building reforms in education from an early stage before the peace treaty signed. This was possible as the Secretariat of Education, approved by the SPLM in 1984, provided an important building block for the development of the new government in the South Sudan. Since 2000, in partnership with UNICEF, the Secretariat was able to develop into a Ministry of Education.[56]

These approaches have been successful given the sensitivity of agencies of working within particular contexts. Complications can arise where this heightens tensions between *de facto* and *de jure* governments, with external agencies caught in-between. A particularly innovative approach to building relationships between the two, with possible spill-over effects beyond the education sector at least at a local level, is evident with respect to Save the Children-Norway's work in Nepal. Government strategies towards community support for schooling have been viewed at best with suspicion, and school buildings have been a target of Maoist attacks. In this context, SC-Norway works in accordance with public plans and procedures, with the aim of bringing together Maoists and government officials to support community-driven initiatives in this context (Box 5). This example provides an innovative model of an external agency supporting service delivery in a highly volatile politicised setting, by building trust over time and brokering partnerships with local governance bodies through local community members.

Box 5: Working with *de jure* and *de facto* governance

SC-Norway's education programme in Nepal was initially viewed with distrust by the Maoist rebels, who viewed their intention of supporting education in areas they controlled as a way of supporting the prevailing political system. In addition, Maoists were also suspicious that SC-Norway was working with the government to gather information against them. SC-Norway started by building support through the development of education committees formed at a very local level – amongst 10-30 households within a hamlet. These were involved in collecting their own education data, and exploring why children were not in school. This resulted in the District Education Office showing greater commitment to these community-supported schools. Initially, the Maoists were not willing to support the schools. However, through the committees, community members were able to hold them to account. They said if the rebels would not support them, they would have no right to come to their villages asking for shelter and food. The Maoists eventually agreed, resulting in the District Education Office funding communities directly, with Maoists given the responsibility of auditing the use of funds. Thus, the Maoists became involved in the schools, rather than destroying them. Within these areas, enrolment exceeds 90 percent of the school-aged population. A sign of their success is that parents who were previously able to send their children to private schools in larger towns have moved their children back to attend these schools.

Source: Save the Children Norway-Nepal, 2005.

5.3 Moving from the short- to the long-route – scaling-up local initiatives to support system-wide planning

Where state will is lacking, there are many examples of spontaneous community-based education initiatives which often precede externally-supported provision. However, these initiatives usually occur on a small, localised scale and are not sustainable. Communities may provide volunteer teaching and other support as a short-term solution, but expect initiatives to eventually receive government support.

Building on such initiatives can ensure accountability with the local population is maintained and can support confidence in emerging state institutions, while developing state capacity. This approach can also help to ensure that donors align with local priorities, as they move from direct support to INGOs, towards providing support through state institutions. This is likely to be a more effective way to scale-up innovative provision than attempting to scale up directly through the (I)NGOs, which risks developing parallel systems. Thus, scaling up is best achieved by ensuring that innovations can be integrated into large scale reform, as experience from home-based schools in Afghanistan indicates (Box 6).[57]

The integration of home-based schools has been possible as the capacity of the Ministry of Education has been built, and it does not see these schools as competing with its own plans. A lesson from this is the importance of allowing the government to establish itself and gain confidence in determining its own priorities, allowing space for developing relationships between NGO and state service delivery. In the example of Afghanistan, the transition is likely to have been facilitated by UNICEF's support to institutional development during Afghanistan's arrested development phase.[58]

Box 6: Integrating home-based schooling into national planning in Afghanistan

Home-based schools were of particular importance in providing education to girls under the Taliban, when schooling of girls was officially banned and yet demand for their schooling was

still evident. As a result, women would teach children clandestinely in their own homes. Thus, where there was no state will to support girls' education, even if there might have been capacity to do so, spontaneous initiatives developed. Over time, these schools have become supported by INGOs, including the International Rescue Committee (IRC), as a way of addressing the high numbers of girls out of school. Local appointment of women teachers has meant that these are seen as trusted members of the community, and so encouraging parents to send their girls. As these are by design a small, local initiative that, even at their peak, operated on a relatively small scale, a key to their success would be to ensure that innovations are built upon, and integrated into state systems when this became feasible. This has been given particular attention in Afghanistan's now post-conflict state, in two ways. In one case, the students and teachers remain in place, and the home-based school simply changes status to become an officially recognized and supported government school. In the other case, the home-based school ceases to operate and the students – and when possible the teachers – transfer to a government school. Sometimes the students transferring into a government school are joined by additional students coming from other nearby areas, as well as new students entering school for the first time. IRC is working on a third scenario that would cluster several nearby home-based schools to create one new government school.

Since the home-based schools comply with Ministry of Education policies and curricula, a smooth transition between home-based schools and the formal, government system is possible in a situation where demand for this has increased, in part due to UNICEF's successful 'back-to-school' campaign. As a result, girls' enrolment increased dramatically, from just three percent to 30 percent within a year. Furthermore, by framing home-based schools within the policy parameters and objectives of the government, IRC and other NGOs are helping strengthen the government system as opposed to competing with it. These schools promote and raise the profile of education at the community level, increasing demand for government schools.

Source: Kirk and Winthrop (nd).

5.4 Supporting state-building through contracting out to non-state providers

Rather than bypassing the state through direct support to NGOs, donors can choose to put aid on-budget (including within the context of a sector-wide approach) to enable governments to be in control of contracting NGOs, where they have the willingness to support service delivery, but lack capacity. Contracting out is not common in fragile states and not as evident in the education sector as in health, water and sanitation.[59] Where it does occur, it is susceptible to problems related to capacity constraints as well as the risk that benefits will accrue to local and national elites and foreign interests.[60] While it is unlikely that a contractor in a fragile state could run primary schools at the scale required for contracting to be efficient, it is possible that contracting out technical and higher levels of education could be feasible and beneficial in supporting capacity development.

Management and monitoring of service delivery via such contracts requires significant and complex forms of capacity, and attention to regulatory measures is needed before embarking on this approach.[61] While this could be an area where for external technical assistance, governments in many post-conflict states seek to gain legitimacy through visible involvement in education provision.

Pakistan offers recent experience where government is involved in contracting out aspects of education service delivery to the non-state sector. Non-state providers take on some responsibilities, while the state maintains control over other aspects,

and so is a form of co-production, where agreement has been reached between different partners of the role they agree to play. However, as the example illustrates, it has not overcome tension and mistrust between the 'partners', so is not evident that it will be sustainable.

Box 8: Public-private partnerships in Pakistan

In Pakistan, where extremely low levels of enrolment are evident in parts of the country, low-budget private schools, mostly unregulated, are fast becoming an important provider of education. Recently, 'public-private partnerships' are being advocated with support from donors, under conditions where will is improving while capacity of the state to provide remains extremely weak. These public-private partnerships were heavily promoted by the first Federal Minister for Education (who herself came from an NGO background) under General Musharraf's rule from 2000 onwards. Building on its experience of facilitating a large community schools programme in the Northern Areas of Pakistan, the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) is involved in enhancing the quality and institutional capacities of low-cost private schools in collaboration with the Government, amongst many other activities it is involved in to strengthen service delivery through partnership. Based on its experience, AKDN finds that there is no particular model or approach to private-public partnerships that can be used or applied as a standard policy instrument. Most public private partnerships are undertaken on a contractual basis, case by case. They find constraints in implementation of partnership arrangements due to limited commitment (sometimes evident by both partners).

One example of private-public partnership in Pakistan is the leasing of under-used and dilapidated government school buildings to private schools for an afternoon shift. The scheme was designed because government schools were deemed to be under-performing due to poor public management, and inadequate teachers and equipment. The private school cannot directly compete with government provision in the morning shift - it has to offer education in the next higher grade, or to provide other types of education such as computer and English language classes. The private provider has to upgrade the facilities of the government school, pay all utility bills for both public and private provision, contribute to other operating costs, and pay 10 percent of any profits to the government school council. The private provider may charge a fee for the afternoon school according to a schedule agreed with government (with a ceiling for primary schools of Rs 200 - £2). This has improved diversity of provision, and access to higher levels that otherwise would not be feasible. However, tensions have arisen as private providers feel that financial demands placed on them are onerous, raising criticisms that 'partnership' is resulting in extraction and for which they receive limited benefit.

Source: Shakil, 2003; Batley et al, 2004.

5.5 Decentralised planning for system-wide development

The examples so far indicate challenges of scaling up innovative approaches, with varying degrees of success. An alternative approach is to design strategies on a large scale from the outset, which is more likely to be feasible where some state will exists. The Direct Support to Schools Programme (DSS) in Mozambique provides an example of an approach undertaken at scale which has been successful in generating change within the education sector and beyond in the context of early recovery (Box 7). Reasons for its success are accredited to its careful design based on analysis of local dynamics. This has paid attention to the creation and constant pursuit of processes which seek feedback from the grassroots so that they can learn from it, and adapt their activities in response. In addition, although the programme is

multi-faceted, it benefited from the adoption of very simple and clear procedures which is important when seeking change on this scale, to avoid complications that might otherwise emerge.[62]

Box 7: The Direct Support to Schools Programme (DSS), Mozambique

After 16 years of civil war, Mozambique remained highly centralised even after democratic processes were introduced. To address this in the education sector, the Direct Support to Schools Programme (DSS) has been developed to promote decentralisation of decision-making and resource management to the school level and foster the quality of education through the supply of basic learning and teaching materials and the involvement of the community in the running of schools. To attain these objectives, the Programme has created a School Quality Fund which is allocated to individual lower and upper primary schools in the form of annual grants which are spent on the most pressing educational needs. At the school level, grants are managed by the school council, composed of teachers, the school principal, the community, and the district education director. The programme, funded by the World Bank, has been undertaken at a relatively large scale - reaching more than 8,300 primary schools in all provinces of Mozambique. As Table 1 indicates, through careful planning, based on analysis of local dynamics and building from the bottom-up, the programme has had wider political impacts beyond the school level, contributing to improved governance in Mozambique. The experience shows that aid can achieve effective results within a poor governance environment. Key to its success has been that, unlike some donor-supported programmes, the DSS is owned by the Ministry of Education which has put considerable effort into its implementation. The World Bank assisted the Ministry in the design of the Programme and provides funds, but it has little influence on the way the DSS is being implemented. This has been possible due to strong leadership from the Ministry, which has offered training and improved working conditions to government officials, raising morale, enhanced the retention rate, and helped to foster confidence within the government in the efficacy of the approach overcoming doubts about the potential effects on its legitimacy, and anxiousness about the fragility of the prevailing order. The main lessons are that the building of national institutional capacity is crucial to success; and the simplicity and flexibility in the design of the DSS allowed a greater responsiveness to beneficiaries' needs, achieved through analyses of local dynamics. There have been spillover effects for other sectors as a result of other ministries learning from this experience.

Table 1: Level and types of effects of DSS Programme, Mozambique

Level of Effects	**Type of Effects**
School-level	Improved access especially for girls Improved school governance Institutionalisation of community participation in school management Enhancing political socialisation through civic education Addressing Social exclusion
District- and Provincial-level	Capacity strengthening through the decentralisation programme (leading to) legitimacy and effective stewardship Mobilisation of local resources in a systematic manner
National-level	Influence of the DSS model on national policy and budget decentralisation Cross-sectoral influence on budget decentralisation

	Greater buy-in from donors to a programme that has national commitment

Source: Kulipossa and Manor, 2006.

5.6 Planning at scale through a sector-wide approach

Nepal provides an example of an innovative sub-sectoral donor approach (basic and primary education SWAp – Education for All programme) in a fragile state environment. This initiative displays commitment to donor harmonisation and coordination in a context where two-thirds of the government development budget is donor-funded. The programme also provides an appropriate emphasis on exclusion. However, the Nepal EFA programme includes some standard elements evident in more typical development contexts, and it is crucial that future SWAps in fragile states be designed and implemented based on a sound analysis of local political context and patterns of fragility.

For example, as with other education SWAps, the Nepal EFA programme shows commitment to decentralisation. As experience from Mozambique indicates, decentralisation reforms can help in ensuring local decision-making and accountability where appropriately designed. However, in Nepal's context, the central government is reluctant to cede control to certain areas of the country as this could strengthen political opponents. In addition, as evident elsewhere, decentralisation can result in education becoming dominated by local rather than central elites, and the reinforcement of inequalities can be particularly detrimental where such policies are associated with the central government. One way in which such problems could be addressed is by learning lessons from the SC-Norway experience and working together with such initiatives, through designing and implementing the programme in consultation with representative groups including communities, teachers, as well as those who might otherwise oppose education reforms.[63]

5.7 Alternative routes to sustainable solutions where there is no other way

As section 5.2 indicated in the context of southern Sudan, UN agencies can play an important role in conditions of arrested development, providing a bridge between initiatives supported by will at a local level, INGOs and donors. This can involve new forms of partnerships – for example, UNICEF in Nepal has partnered with human rights agencies in an attempt to protect schools and children as zones of peace. In some cases, UNICEF has taken on the role as de facto Ministry of Education, and is able to do so given general recognition of them being a universal, neutral, politically independent sector.[64] Where early attention to post-conflict transition is considered even while the UN agency is playing this role, smoother movement between the phases is likely to be possible, as experience from Timor Leste illustrates. This requires attention to the capacity of the UN agencies themselves in fulfilling this complex and demanding role.

Box 9: 'Managed' transition in Timor Leste

Timor Leste provides an example of 'managed' transition within the education system, in line with phases of fragility. As a result of violence during the fight for independence from Indonesia, only five percent of education institutions were left standing. Schools had been systematically looted and teachers, most of them from Indonesia, had fled. As conditions deteriorated, spontaneous schools were established with volunteer teachers supported by

community contributions. At this stage, UNICEF played the role of de facto Ministry of Education. International NGOs focused in particular on the psychosocial needs of traumatised children (including those separated from their families). In the post-conflict transitional phase, before the national Ministry of Education was established, priority was given to developing physical infrastructure, increasing primary school enrolments, and recruiting teachers. As the country moved into early recovery and approached independence, a new education administration was being developed, supported by a Joint Assessment Mission, and a multi-donor Trust Fund was established to pay teachers salaries. Following independence in May 2002, the Ministry of Education Youth and Sports was formally established, which focused attention initially on teacher training, curriculum development, addressing the contentious issue of language of instruction, and developing civil society space. Experience in Timor Leste's transition highlights that political transformation was needed before education transformation was possible, although education could not be ignored while political systems were in the process of transformation.

Source: Nicolai, 2003.

5.8 Opportunities for cross-sectoral convergence

Just as education and fragility are inter-linked, there are other factors associated with both of these – including the availability of income-earning and other livelihood opportunities. Even where supply of education is available, demand may be constrained by the need for children to work to support diminishing household resources. Moreover, for education service delivery to be successful, capacity needs to be addressed beyond the education sector. For example, to ensure enforcement of legislation against abuse of girls in school, the capacity of the legal system needs to be addressed. Thus, by its very nature, education needs to pay attention to development of other sectors if it is to be effective, and many education programmes build these aspects within them. For example, UNICEF has a widespread programme of supporting water and sanitation facilities in schools.

As such, schools might provide an entry point for support to the development of other sector service provision. However, in many circumstances, provision of water and health facilities are seen as more immediate basic needs, and so are given attention in more emergency situations. In such cases, it might be possible to find an entry point for education provision through the delivery of other services by 'piggy backing' on generic community funds to start developing support for educational development which will be important for longer-term capacity.

UNICEF's child-friendly community initiative in Sudan provides an example of an integrated, multi-sectoral and community-driven approach for the delivery of basic services to poor and vulnerable people in a conflict affected area. It operates in collaboration between UNICEF, Ministry of International Cooperation, the National Fund for States' Support, and relevant line ministries (including the Ministry of Education). The programme is seen as having been more successful in the education sector compared with other sectors, in terms of endorsement and outcomes, although it has not been able to reach the extreme poor (including orphans). The reasons for the relative success in education would be worth exploring – for example, is it because education is less dependent on infrastructure and/or skilled human resources (since classes can be held outside by untrained teachers, unlike health delivery, and water provision requires investment in infrastructure in particular)?[65]

5.9 Challenges in blended approaches

The above examples suggest a variety of effective approaches to blending short-and long-route accountability to support service delivery and longer-term state-building in fragile states. These approaches avoid further deterioration and support turnaround through starting locally with the intention of scaling-up or working at scale within a system-wide approach. Lessons can be drawn from these cases according to the typology:[66]

Arrested development – The limited available evidence indicates that engagement with civil society through the UN system in this phase can be planned in such a way to enable transition to a state system when this becomes possible (e.g. UNICEF's support in Sudan, Afghanistan and Timor Leste).
Deterioration - 1) stay engaged with government as long as possible and use government systems but look at how the system is interacting with the conflict (e.g. Nepal's SWAp) 2) where it is no longer possible to work with government (either because it has collapsed or it becomes politically impossible), education can be supported locally, with support of appropriate institutions (e.g. SC-Norway's experience in Nepal; and SC-UK's experience in Somalia and Somaliland).
Post-conflict transition/early recovery - this is the area that has been most researched in education and where there is the most evidence from case studies. Where there is some political willingness, there may be an opportunity to re-engage through government systems. Opportunities may exist to build on community level activity (e.g. Afghanistan home-based schools' integration into system-wide planning), and support decentralised planning (e.g. Mozambique's Decentralised Support to Schools' programme). Non-state actors are likely to play an important role in facilitating this process, especially in the area of community and local government capacity building, with simultaneous efforts needed at central level, which might be facilitated through contracting out (e.g Pakistan Private-Public Partnerships).

Inevitably, these approaches give rise to a number of challenges that are likely to be encountered. First, in situations where the state is unable/unwilling to deliver, donor support to INGOs often results in fragmented service delivery by a large number of providers on a small scale. As a result, newly-formed governments struggling to develop capacity must take on very difficult coordination. In Afghanistan, for example, there are more than 3,000 NGOs operating since the fall of the Taliban in 2001 (although not all are working in education). In this case, NGOs have launched a code of conduct in 2005 with the aim of helping the government by allowing them to be in a better position to monitor and verify the work of NGOs.[67]

Second, it is important to consider the legitimacy of NGOs which may be no more efficient or democratic than government. In Nepal, for example, there are many NGOs operating, but in this case many of them tend to act quite independently and outside government regulations (although there are exceptions, as the example of Save the Children-Norway illustrated). Third, attention needs to be paid to the capacity of NGOs themselves as they take on multiple roles including supporting service delivery directly, along with supporting state institution-building. Fourth, given NGO provision often occurs at a local level on a relatively small scale with the intention to scale-up activities, this frequently does not happen. To be successful, political commitment is required, but can be a key obstacle particularly where newly-formed states need to gain their self-confidence, and INGO reforms may be felt to be

a challenge to this. Rather than attempting to replicate specific elements of reform, as is often intended, it is more appropriate to scale up the conditions that permitted the initial reform, based on the generation of widespread and locally-rooted demand for it, as the experience from home-based schooling in Afghanistan has shown.[68]

Moreover, the innovative approaches often depend on community support. However, communities are not homogenous, and can also lack capacity and will to serve some parts of their own population, with problems in particular of working in divided communities which can be a cause of the fragility.[69] Community involvement in school management may threaten the interests of teachers, and in some cases may not be possible at all. For example, an examination of experience during and after the war in Bosnia found the notion of community 'engagement' to be exaggerated. To the extent it did occur it was a substitute for the state, undermining rather than contributing to state legitimacy in the longer term.[70]

A final challenge is to ensure continuity even when donor agencies change during the post-conflict transition as explored in the following section.

6. Aid Effectiveness - rights and risks, transition and coordination

6.1 Arrested Development and Deterioration - Rights and Risks

How can education sector service provision contribute to turnaround for those countries identified as in arrested development or deterioration? For arrested development and deteriorating states, donors are typically and correctly extremely cautious in providing resources. Even in most difficult cases, humanitarian grounds provoke limited education expenditure most often related to UN rights mandates and the specialist capabilities of bi-laterals (e.g. Norway) and INGOs.

The examples given earlier of education interventions by INGOs, e.g. in Nepal, Southern Sudan and Somalia/Somaliland, suggest that innovative approaches building on local will and capacity can help support an eventual compact between government and citizens within a long-route to accountability, when some political will becomes evident. However, Nepal has a long history of donor support in the sector and may be capable of quick recovery, while Somalia and Southern Sudan have received less than half of Nepal's donor support and face greater risk of unsustainable service provision.

What explains the variety in level of support? Recognition of child-protection and the rights of the child suggest a strong case for expanding the commitment to education in emergencies more broadly and there is a compelling argument on these grounds especially for children affected by war.[71] A donor's allocation of resources to fragile states is typically informed by historic links, by geo-political considerations and by accident -the weight of habit. Whilst selectivity criteria exist for mainstream development assistance, nothing has been identified at the most senior-level for these especially difficult types of fragile states. Expansion of sector specific investments will necessarily depend, for the time being, upon these donor-specific processes.

Despite increased recognition of the importance of supporting education throughout different phases of fragility, donor behaviour, as seen in the outcomes of consolidated appeals processes where education does badly, have yet to accept the case whole heartedly.[72] It is possible that evidence of performance (for example through application of the INEE minimum standards) may change this, but the significant expansion of donor education resources in arrested development and deteriorating fragile states is not likely. The trade-off with risk appears to be too high.

In many arrested and deteriorating fragile states, the conditions to apply the DAC Principles of Good Donor Engagement may often exist only partially. Those that require engagement with the state cannot be applied in the absence of states or in states where there is no demonstrated political will to make development happen. In such cases, in addition to principles emphasising donor coordination, the principles of do no harm and of moving from reaction to prevention are especially relevant. The broader conclusion however is that there is not a sufficiently well-articulated strategy for engagement that encourages donors, with the exception of humanitarian leaders such as Norway who have prioritised education in emergencies. For arrested and deteriorating fragile states, the donor calculus on risks and rights, in a resource constrained context, exposes the limitations of rights-based agendas. This is despite the endorsement of education as one of the main pillars of humanitarian relief.

The longer and better lives of children and reducing the utter wretchedness of the effects of war on them could hardly have a stronger emotional appeal - if it could be done well the rights and risks calculus could well change. Perversely perhaps, the recognition that education is such a central plank of the process towards sustained turnaround is part of the problem. Appreciation of the importance of the education sector in developing a stable political economy increases the perceived risk of supporting inappropriate education initiatives where political will is absent (arrested) or getting weaker (deteriorating).

6.2 Post-conflict transition and early recovery - How can donors work best?

The arguments thus far suggest that the opportunities for effective donor engagement in fragile states are most likely where turnaround is a reasonable prospect. This is possible in the many post-conflict transitional situations where there is some evidence of political will.[73] Timor Leste is perhaps one of the most impressive examples in several sectors including education where political will has provided the basis for a rapid maturing of the donor-national government partnership (see Section 5.7). Also in Afghanistan[74], where the strength of leadership is challenged, the demonstration of political will has been crucial in catalysing donor resources, reducing the risks of greater relapse. Of course, the geo-politics of aid do not result in 'will' being the only criterion for aid allocations.

The existence of at least some initial political will is a defining characteristic of fragile states in early recovery; we can also group with them immediate post-conflict countries where there is evidence of political will.[75] In these contexts the opportunities to deliver development results is better but aid interventions can also effect the achievement of turnaround by strengthening incipient political will and bolstering capacity, especially at a local level. World Bank research specifically identifies the development education as one of the most important contributors to sustained turnaround. The role of communities, the reform of the curriculum and

investment in teacher training have been frequently identified as having special relevance in this respect, as sections 4 and 5 in this paper highlight. An example of the rationale for one agency's priorities within the education sector in fragile states is evident in a USAID paper which is directed towards understanding how the five goals of USAID's policy towards fragile states can be influenced by education investments. The first two of these goals - promoting transformational development and strengthening fragile states - are especially pertinent to sustained turnaround. The paper gives examples of programme for street children (Brazil), reintegration of child soldiers (Mozambique) and teacher training (Bosnia) where there are apparent causal links from education provision to progress on these goals.[76]

The widely-held view that education matters in special ways as a barometer of the relationship between the state and its citizens is supported by this study. It would suggest that, where incipient political will does exist, there are opportunities to work in the sector strategically. This is true of both immediate post-conflict interventions and early recovery as the cases demonstrate. However, the difficult issue that donors face is in demonstrating their own capacity to move smoothly from immediate post-emergency interventions to early recovery.[77] There may be principal-agent problems as donors preferred modalities change and development partners leave and join the sector effort. As their instruments change, even though there may be a consensus that political will exists, the modalities of blending and moving resources from one stage to the next are not developed.

6.3 Inter- and intra-agency coordination- The accountability, will and capacity of donors

Donor humanitarian interventions are increasingly more coordinated. However it is not always so evident that these coordination efforts are sustained, especially once the immediate emergency is offer. Part of the problem is that agency criteria determining emergency aid operate differently *and* independently of development aid - the funding windows are different. The aid literature[78] also shows that donors typically reduce their aid after their initial humanitarian support which perhaps reflects these differences in funding windows. This is paradoxical since the same literature also shows, for countries with some political will, in early recovery, provides the best opportunities to use external resources effectively to build state capacity and will. Even though education is a relative newcomer to the humanitarian fold - for some at least and for some types of emergency - it has quickly adopted the same aid instruments that reflect these different criteria.

There are often serious impediments to any one bi-lateral agency seeking internal coherence in aid for education through the emergency-development transition precisely because of the different allocative criteria used between humanitarian and development assistance.[79] This is true also at the international-level where the Consolidated Appeals Process is not effectively linked to the emergent sector agendas post-emergency even though both UNICEF and UNESCO explicitly recognise the importance of trying to do so. In effect this means that donors are disadvantaging themselves with respect to the application of the two Principles of Good Practice on staying engaged and promoting coherence.

Whilst some agencies consciously plan on extended partnership through the transition to achieve coherence and re-establish capacity (e.g. AKDN in Pakistan and

Afghanistan), this is not generally the case. More often, weak transitional financing arrangements create problems for coherent planning; it is the absence of predictable funding, based on long term partnership which national leaders[80] have identified as a serious constraint in their partnerships with the international community. Ideally, these partnerships should be based on the prospect of a needs-driven long term arrangement and responsive to priorities of the national leadership; and, they should also be based on coordination with other external partners in ways that reduces transactions costs to local partners. In more normal development contexts, coordination has become a central concern of donors, through sectoral coordination groups, SWAps and coordination around PRSP processes and direct budget support. The unaddressed problems of coordination centre on the transitional arrangements between the humanitarian episode and the establishment of state will and capacity conditions that allow the sensible use of these coordination approaches.

There are some examples from fragile states on incipient attempts to promote transitional coordination in the education sector. These include the Nepal SWAp and donors in DRC, Southern Sudan and Somalia exploring common ways of pooling resources[81] and using Joint Assessment Missions (e.g. Sudan). There are also joint Government/Donor groups for education engaged in policy dialogue and sharing of information and resources in Juba, Kinshasa and Nairobi (for Somalia) whose initial concern is to achieve a more coordinated intervention than was possible at the height of the conflict. These are examples where external partners have responded to the importance of holistic planning and coordination as a central part of the in-country process of whatever sequence of contributions and activities are undertaken. However, the education sector has not been in general been able to demonstrate good practice in managing the post-conflict transition. Donors are of course sensitive to the needs in managing transition, which are much discussed, and have reviewed opportunities for more effective engagement through greater flexibility in aid instruments.[82] Moreover, these poorly coordinated decision taking processes are also due to lack of *intra*-agency coordination between humanitarian and mainstream development parts of agencies and their sub-contractors, as well as those amongst those working within the education sector and those supporting the governance agenda more generally. But bi-lateral donor accountability is to its tax payers and there is no international accountability for the fractures and fissures in sector support that emerge as a consequence of all their independent decision-taking processes.

6.4 A new sector financing strategy in education - transitional trust funds

There is a clear role for new sector financing strategies which blend emergency and early recovery processes. The problem is not so much an absence of expertise, or even resources sometimes, but that emergency and post-emergency humanitarian agendas are often startlingly disconnected, even within the same agency, from the broader processes of state recapicitance and sector development that characterise aid purposes in early recovery. Fast impact activities have an important function both in dealing with emergency needs and in promoting state legitimacy but they are unlikely to contribute to sustainable turnaround if the spending is not coordinated and not part of the broader processes of strengthening state capacity and will.

The suggestion of a new financing strategy requires cooperation between two groups of development professionals - the humanitarian-driven and development-driven agenda - and as such is a challenge to donor capacity and will. Yet, in education,

there are significant opportunities to move beyond this impasse through innovative financing arrangements. These exist because members of INEE working in this field have demonstrated a remarkable commitment to effective performance, which could be strengthened by increased donor support and collaboration within the network. Explicitly, drawing together the FTI fragile states agenda together with INEE is one approach which could strengthen both areas of work.

The INEE has developed standards and is applying them.[83] These standards, complementing those from Sphere in other sectors, have been developed in an inclusive and rigorous manner. The fifth category in the INEE standards relates to education policy and coordination and proposes a qualitative indicator that 'Emergency education programmes are planned and implemented in a manner that provides for their integration into longer-term development of the education sector'.[84] This is very welcome, though there is scope for strengthening it and relating it explicitly to broader processes of national policy development. But the purpose of such strengthening would be to facilitate transitions within the sector (possibly drawing on some of the experiences outlined in section 5) not to extend the patterns of emergency provision *per se*. Transition would then be based on a policy analysis and financing strategy designed to ensure the incorporation of these standards in continuing donor support to the sector in early recovery.

Sector financing transition arrangements have to address two key needs. First is the need to ensure that partnerships relationships are based on principles of good engagement by promoting coordination and local ownership and seeking to secure longer term funding arrangements (assisted by pooling resources). Secondly, the sector strategy has to be located within the wider partnership strategy for managing the transition; striving for less fragility and a more normalised development context. Trust Funds have enjoyed some success in addressing these needs and one useful approach would be Education Sector Transitional Trust Funds. These may be part of a wider trust fund, but need not be.

The FTI has already proposed action in four pilot fragile states countries to assess its capacity and effective operability in these contexts.[85] The purpose of a trust fund would be to build on these pilots globally with respect to fragile states and would focus on those where resource gaps and/or absorptive capacity is most serious. However, the availability of funds is not the guiding principle for application of the trust fund mandate. The first and most fundamental purpose would be to align donor support with a coherent domestically-owned sector development strategy that was embedded in the broader processes of strengthening public sector management of resources.

The modality, similar to the FTI approach elsewhere, might be a series of 'child' funds but giving the trust -and accountability- of international leadership to the agency most competent in context to take forward education in the early recovery agenda. A key requirement is the capacity to provide the analytic sector work that the FTI's Education Programme Development Fund (EPDF) has been set up to provide, and which would be the default mechanism for procuring such work. But, such EPDF activities will need to consciously build on the work of existing partners in the sector especially INEE partners who have meanwhile been responsible for assisting education service delivery. The trust fund would be explicitly directed towards being

sensitive to continuity needs and utilise the expertise of the humanitarian actors - including the INGOs - that have engaged with the sector and been delivering education services. The analytic and sector work would seek to locate these activities in a broader medium term expenditure framework for education and utilise them in locating education sector priorities in national processes around poverty reduction, the budget and expenditure prioritisation. Such an initiative could bring both development and humanitarian expertise together in a constructive fashion if it were consciously build on the fifth category of the INEE standards on policy and coordination. This would help ensure that sector work was not informed only by the more general principles for managing aid in early recovery (see Box 10) but by the very considerable experience and expertise developed by INEE partners working in immediate post-conflict contexts.

Unlike the present remit and design of Catalytic Funds, these trust funds would not have a short shelf-life, and would need to have commitment to long-term, predictable financing (necessary for support to the education sector, where the vast majority of resources are spent on teacher salaries) - the problem of continuity of funding is one of the most aggravating transactions costs that recipient governments face. This problem of the lack of a long-term commitment was explicitly underlined by a high-level workshop run for national reformers from fragile states.[86] The problem of course is that there is no international accountability for continuity so donors are free to treat countries as aid darlings or orphans with impunity; it is typically not their chosen responsibility to address continuity issues. The trust fund could then be the pre-cursor of SWAp arrangements or other coordination mechanisms as domestic capacity strengthens, and only become a sunset fund when direct budget support, and, eventually, local resourcing, were adequate to support the education sector.

Whilst a trust fund ideally would have freedom on allocation decisions, accountable through agreed processes and based upon country performance, in practice donors have their own preferences. Indeed, they use them in existing trust funds arrangements to promote specific agendas that they strongly support. Their willingness to drop these for a sector specific coordination mechanism in the interests of aid effectiveness would be a litmus test of their rights-based commitments to education. Even so, it is not realistic to expect all donors to spend through such trust funds but a commitment to work in consonance with it, and thereby with national government strategy, would be the least that responsible donors could be expected to provide and be accountable for.

A core approach developed precisely to strengthen the quality of engagement where incipient state will exists is the use of a Transitional Results Matrix (TRM). This is typically a national-level instrument but it implies the application of TRM principles (see Box 10) at sector-level.[87] The analytic and sector work should use such a framework in the assessment of sector strategy and in the identification of opportunities to support education in ways that contribute to state building. The Education Transitional Trust Fund would be designed to operate in harmony with national-level processes and partnership arrangements. It is intended as a vehicle to apply those principles more effectively at sector-level. Thus, capacity building, salaries, recruitment, monitoring and evaluation, expenditure priorities and budget envelope would all be exactly consonant with national-level processes. The trust fund would be an opportunity for donors wishing to spend on education to ensure that their

investments are part of and supportive of the wider development agenda as well as building on the achievements and expertise of earlier humanitarian interventions.

Box 10: Summary of Transitional Results Matrix Principles

Transitional Results Matrices help apply the poverty reduction strategy principles of a unified, country-driven plan to fragile settings. TRMs are based on five principles, derived from the Rome Declaration and its harmonization agenda but adapted to the circumstances of fragile states in transition. Matrices need to be **simple**, **selective**, **integrated** across political, security, economic and social aspects of recovery, **nationally owned**, and have **sufficient donor buy-in**. They promote the use of outcome indicators and monitorable targets, including intermediate indicators to track progress of recovery programs. They function as a management tool for strategic planning and implementation monitoring and an umbrella for donor coordination. In this way, the framework can become a compact of joint responsibilities between country authorities and the donor community. By enhancing transparency across the board, TRMs can create strong incentives to achieve more visible results in post-conflict reconstruction and provide a basis for participation and domestic scrutiny by civil society.

7. Conclusions

Education interventions can contribute to turnaround by supporting policy processes that mitigate fragility and promote pro-poor development. While the EFA and MDG goals provide a basis for support to education in fragile states (both with respect to the recognition of education as a right, and in terms of its contribution to development), specific local conditions of fragility will influence the prioritisation and sequencing of education interventions so that security and governance objectives are also addressed. For example, non-formal, demand-driven livelihood education for out-of-school youth is likely to deserve attention, as is secondary and higher education if national capacity is to be (re-)developed.

The main opportunities for effective donor support are where incipient will exists. Such will can be identified at different levels (locally, nationally and internationally). Even in arrested development and deteriorating conditions, will is often found at local levels, as evident by spontaneous community initiatives. Moreover, even though willingness for pro-poor reform more generally might be weak, there is often a will by states to support education, given its role in national identity formation (with possible negative or positive consequences). Donors can target their aid by supporting existing will, encouraging the strengthening of will at other levels, and supporting capacity which can be built upon as will emerges.

Some issues arising from the paper include that:

1. There is considerable momentum currently aimed at developing approaches to support education in fragile states– as evident from the important work of the INEE network, as well as recent initiatives associated with the FTI.
2. A variety of evidence shows how education can fuel fragility. However, while there are anecdotal accounts, supported by intuition, there is very limited evidence of how education helps mitigate the risk of fragility, or can promote turnaround. Evidenced-based evaluations of peace education, human rights education, citizenship education, and similar programmes are required.
3. While evidence of education service delivery outcomes in post-conflict transition and early recovery phases is available, there is limited

documentation of local community and INGO support to education service delivery taking place in arrested development or deteriorating conditions.

4. Education interventions that shadow local government efforts raise challenges for scaling-up and highlight the importance of planning for system-wide development at an early stage. Education programmes should address longer-term state building in their initial design and through ongoing evaluations.
5. The DAC typology adopted in the paper is helpful in finding commonalities within different phases of fragilities, and possible responses to these. However, in developing responses further, as the DAC first Principle states, it is crucial to take context as a starting point.
6. Drivers of change in education vary, depending in part on the relative strength and authority of civil society and the state in a particular context. Many drivers of change studies undertaken to date do not sufficiently address drivers with respect to social services specifically. Given that services such as education are often an entry point for donor intervention, further political analysis of the influences on these services is needed.
7. An important challenge donors are now facing is in relation to the blending of immediate response to emergencies with the development of the sector in early recovery. New ways of working on this transition – both in terms of inter- and intra-agency coordination, as well as through the development of appropriate aid instruments, are feasible - subject to the capacity, will, and accountability of donors.

To address these issues, suggestions for ways forward include:

1. Development of a compendium of case studies associated with education in fragile states, bringing together available (including unpublished) material, and drawing on the rich practitioner experience. This could be supported via the INEE website, which already has links to key resources.[88]
2. Drawing on the INEE, DAC and FTI networks (which are, in any case, overlapping in membership), development of principles for supporting education in fragile states.[89] This can bring together the strength of each of the networks with respect to attention to education processes, aid effectiveness, and service delivery in fragile states, and can draw on the positive experience of the consultative process undertaken to develop the INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies. It will also help to ensure that the expertise within INGOs and donors is brought together. These principles should consider ways of identifying and supporting will and capacity at the different levels at which it occurs (locally, nationally and internationally). Such principles need to be driven by in-country expertise and priorities, and be ones that donors agree to, providing a bridge between capacity building and potential sustainability of policy reform and immediate service delivery – so bridging the humanitarian and development divide.
3. Support to sector-specific drivers of change analyses in fragile states, based on existing drivers of change approaches combined with conflict analysis approaches, and informed by recent relevant studies on education. This analysis needs to include a conflict and peace impact assessment with respect to education, considering key actors and stakeholders with influence over sectoral developments (both reformers whose participation is beneficial and potential spoilers), as well as patterns of fragility (such as corruption, exclusion or organised violence), and patterns of resilience (such as tolerance

and national identity). The local context analysis should address temporal issues (windows of opportunity for intervention), and geographic considerations (including different strategies required in rural and urban settings etc.).[90]

4. Ensuring that monitoring and evaluation is built into programmes to address both immediate educational outcomes and broader intended benefits such as promoting security, and supporting state-building.
5. Consideration of further possibilities for developing a transitional trust fund for bridging support to fragile states between humanitarian and development phases.
6. Development of approaches within and between agencies (including the involvement of NGOs) to ensure coordination between those responsible for governance and sector support, across humanitarian and development phases.

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Appendix 1: Information sources

Information for the paper has been gathered via the following sources:

- Review of available literature. From this, it is evident that there is a significant and growing agency literature, including unpublished materials in the area, but less availability of academic research or external evaluation reports.[91]
- Email, telephone and face-to-face interviews with NGOs, and bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies contacted via OECD DAC, INEE, FTI Fragile States Working Group and UNICEF networks, and personal contacts. We have received extremely enthusiastic responses from these sources, highlighting importance and relevance of the issues being addressed.
- Presentation of initial findings, and feedback at the Oxford Conference on Education and Conflict in April, organised by UNICEF and the Department for Education Studies, University of Oxford.
- Roundtable at the Oxford Conference on Education and Conflict, including key stakeholders from a range of agencies.
- Peer review of draft paper in a meeting held at UNICEF, New York, 9th May 2006; extensive further review of the draft through e-mail feedback.

Because this was a desk-based study, access has mainly been to international agency staff, as well as responses by email from some country field staff, of UNICEF and Save the Children in particular. However, it has not been possible to obtain perspectives of governments or civil society, and this deserves further attention to find out their own views on the constraints they face, rather than relying only on the views of agencies supporting them.

Appendix 2: Short and long routes of accountability



Source: Meagher, 2005, adapted from the World Bank (2003: 49)

Endnotes

[1] Further details about the Framework can be found in Meagher, 2005.
[2] As agreed at the outset of the work, the paper does not intend to address issues related to refugee and IDP education specifically. However, lessons will be drawn from the implications of relevant programmes following the transition from an emergency situation. A paper is being prepared on behalf of NORAD focusing on education in emergencies in particular (Lexow, 2006).
[3] Appendix One details the information sources drawn on for the study.
[4] Colenso, 2005; FTI, 2005. These papers highlight the problems associated with data collection in fragile states, and so recognise that figures need to be treated with caution.
[5] Smith and Vaux, 2003.
[6] Talbot, 2002.
[7] Sommers 2004 p93
[8] Talbot, 2005; Tomlinson and Benefield, 2005; World Bank, 2005a; Nicolai and Triplehorn 2003.
[9] See Berry *et al.*, 2004, for an assessment of how these different agenda relate to provision of social services. See also Burde, 2005, for an elaboration of these agenda.
[10] Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2001, The Stanley Foundation, 2002.
[11] The specific measure of aid performance employed in most aid effectiveness studies is the contribution aid makes to growth and therefore to poverty reduction. The evidence base (developed by the World Bank) identifies the dependence of aid effectiveness upon good policies (but see McGillivray 2006 and Clemens et al, 2005). Fragile states are identified as those not having good policies by definition, and therefore perform poorly on orthodox selectivity criteria. Increasingly, donors have been using selectivity criteria to target their aid towards countries where good policy conditions exist. The Education for All Fast Track Initiative is one such case. The FTI has conventionally supported good performers, selected on the basis of having a PRSP and credible education plan in place, although attention is now being given to fragile states, see Section 6.
[12] See Greeley, 2006, for a summary account of that literature and for a framework on aid effectiveness in fragile states on which this section is based.
[13] IDS, 2006. Chauvet and Collier, 2005, use improvements in a country's performance in the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) to measure turnaround.
[14] Chauvet and Collier, 2005. Earlier work, (Collier and Hoeffler, 2003) provides a broad demonstration that, contrary to earlier models of aid and conflict that focused on state capture -to capture aid- aid does not increase the risk of conflict.
[15] Greeley, 2006.
[16] Manor, 2006.
[17] The paper uses the World Bank term, Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) to refer to fragile states.
[18] World Bank (2005a) provides an account of World Bank experience with community-based and community-driven development and is cautiously upbeat. The work reported by Manor stresses the specific importance of these approaches in fragile states contexts.
[19] Based on cross-country regression analysis, it has been estimated that each year of education reduces the risk of conflict by 20 percent, with secondary education found to be particularly important for promoting turnaround (Meagher, 2005; Chauvet and Collier, 2005). However, it is difficult to disentangle education's effect from other influences. Moreover, there is evidence of education contributing to *increased* fragility, (Buckland, 2005; Vaux and Visman, 2005; Burde, 2005; Davies, 2005; Bush and Saltarelli, 2000; Smith and Vaux, 2003; Seitz, 2004); but there is less country-based evidence of its role in promoting turnaround although there is no shortage of suggested possible benefits to governance and peace building processes.
[20] Chauvet and Collier, 2005, look at two scenarios; first where countries show signs of policy reform commitment through incremental improvement in their CPIA scores. These, they argue, are conditions that show will and should trigger donor response. The second scenario is where countries move from incipient reform to sustained improvement in CPIAs, enough to achieve turnaround.
[21] Chauvet and Collier further refine their cross-country regression analysis to look at timing; technical assistance is seen to be particularly valuable in the second four-year period after the resumption of engagement in most countries. In other words, with some will, TA can be especially valuable in bolstering it but it cannot create that initial will.
[22] Creative Associates, 2006
[23] Kirk, 2003.

[24] Rose and Brown, 2004.
[25] Putzel, 2003.
[26] Creative Associates, 2006. The study also draws attention to two unresolved issues. The first is the donor focus on primary education and the need for distribution of services to secondary schools and out of school youth as well as disadvantaged populations (horizontal equity). The second relates to democracy and its potential for strengthening education service provision. The results from Chauvet and Collier, perhaps counter-intuitively, did not find their democracy variable was significant in promoting sustained turnaround.
[27] See Appendix 2.
[28] Rose and Brown, 2004.
[29] Kabeer and Subrahmanian, 1996.
[30] FTI, 2006.
[31] Buckland, 2005. Sinclair, 2002.
[32] Obura, 2003.
[33] Sommers, 2005;
[34] Breidlid, 2005.
[35] Creative Associates, 2006.
[36] Malik,1996.
[37] Bano, forthcoming.
[38] See Smith and Vaux, 2003: 25 for summary of different forms of peace education programmes; and Sinclair, 2004, and Satarelli, 2000, for different curriculum initiatives related to education in conflict/post-conflict settings.
[39] Buckland, 2005.
[40] Tawil and Harley, 2004
[41] Buckland, 2005: 49
[42] Buckland, 2005
[43] Vaux and Visman, 2005.
[44] Lexow, 2006.
[45] Kirk, 2003.
[46] Sinclair, 2002.
[47] Chauvet and Collier, 2005.
[48] Brown, 2005 cited in Lexow, 2006.
[49] Creative Associates, 2006.
[50] Smith and Vaux, 2003.
[51] Buckland, 2005: xx.
[52] Buckland, 2005: 11.
[53] http://www.ginie.org/ginie-crises-links/childsoldiers/liberia_story.html.
[54] Carlson et al, 2005.
[55] Vaux and Visman, 2005: 34.
[56] Lexow, 2006. Sommers, 2005.
[57] See Creative Associates 2006 case study on Afghanistan for analysis of the political economy setting.
[58] Rugh and van Kalmthout, 2000; Rugh, 1998.
[59] Berry et al., 2004; LaRocque, 2005
[60] Palmer et al, 2006 ; Vaux and Visman, 2005.
[61] Vaux and Visman, 2005.
[62] Manor, 2006.
[63] See Vaux et al., 2006, for a detailed analysis of the EFA programme in Nepal from a conflict perspective.
[64] Berry et al., 2004.
[65] Moreno-Torres, 2005. Community-Driven Development programmes also provide useful experiences of cross-sectoral approaches through social funds (Sommers, 2004, World Bank, 2005a).
[66] With the important caveat, noted earlier in the paper, of difficulties arising from typecasting countries within particular categories.
[67] Lexow, 2006.
[68] Samoff and Sebatane (2001). The authors provide a useful overview of experiences of scaling-up education reforms in sub-Saharan Africa, concluding that there are very few successful examples of this, and the conditions that can support its achievement, many of which relate to conditions for

successful service delivery more generally – including the importance of leadership, sustained local involvement, careful planning for scaling-up from the outset, and availability of information systems.

[69] Burde, 2004 ; Slaymaker et al 2005.

[70] Burde, 2004.

[71] Nicolai and Triplehorn, 2003. Their arguments suggest that the SC global alliance can potentially help strengthen commitments to child rights by demonstrating effectiveness.

[72] Lexow (2006) in her recent very insightful report on education in emergencies states that 'Funding to education in humanitarian assistance has increased tremendously if one looks at natural disasters and conflicts combined. But it is less certain that the same increase has happened in conflict ridden areas. Figures from the country case studies show that the gap between requirements and actual contributions is huge'.

[73] Chauvet and Collier, 2005. This raise a methodological, and substantive, issue as to whether some types of aid induce will and turnaround or is aid simply responsive to a perceived prospect of turnaround?

[74] The Afghanistan education sector has attracted a number of studies with some very positive examples and, less positively, an illustration of challenges from changed and weakened leadership in the sector. See, for example, Creative Associates, 2006.

[75] Countries do not of course move on a continuum of positive change once initial will is evidenced. Initial will is fragile and can move in positive and negative directions.

[76] Burde, 2005.

[77] Leader and Colenso, 2005, Colenso, 2005.

[78] Chauvet and Collier, 2005.

[79] Lexow, 2002.

[80] UNDP, 2005.

[81] One example is the Joint Donor office that has just been set up in Juba (UK, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden).

[82] See Berry *et al*, 2004. Also Sommers, 2004 on coordination.

[83] See Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (2006) for a good and very recent example. Others are available on the INEE website.

[84] INEE, 2004, p76.

[85] FTI, 2005; FTI, 2006.

[86] UNDP 2005.

[87] World Bank, 2005b has developed detailed guidelines on use of the Transitional Results Matrix.

[88] A database of documents has been developed for this paper, considerably more extensive than those it has been possible to refer to, which could contribute to the development of the database.

[89] The draft USAID Assessment Tool for working in fragile states could contribute to this.

[90] Including Vaux et al., 2006; studies in the IIEP Education in Emergencies series; and Creative Associates, 2006.

[91] Colenso 2005.